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Abstract
In this paper I look at the tax treatment of households under in-
dividual filings and characterise the eﬃciency properties of an income
tax schedule that redistributes from rich to poor households. Because
tax liabilities are determined on individual incomes but the decision
to earn those incomes are made at the household level, the tax liable
members of the same household can side trade leisure for net income
with one another, and such side trade enables them to carry out tax
arbitrage. I analyse the problem for a two class economy both with
and without perfect assortative mating. The main conclusion is that
the prevention of tax arbitrage imposes structure on the graduation
of the tax schedule.
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1 Introduction
Comparative tax studies for advanced economies (OECD: Messere, 1993, EU:
O’Donoghue & Sutherland, 1999) show that many countries consider the in-
dividual as the tax unit. Most OECD countries apply this principle to some
extent, and many recent tax reforms have substituted the family for the in-
dividual as the tax unit. What is the position of optimal income taxation
theory in this respect? The standard model, as exposed by Mirrlees (1971)
or Stiglitz (1982), typically assumes that the agent who makes the decision
to earn an income is also the one who bears the legal tax incidence. Thus, it
is well suited to discuss the taxation of singles or the taxation of household
income. But when labour earnings are the result of a household decision
and taxed at the individual level, the standard model becomes deficient and
needs amendment. In this paper, I take the principle of individual taxa-
tion as given, and ask how an income tax system should treat labour income
when the earnings decisions are made by a small coalition of people, as in
a household with two income earners. In particular, I characterise the eﬃ-
ciency properties of a redistributive income tax system that satisfies such a
household incentive compatibility requirement.
Since my aim is not to carry out a comparative analysis of family taxation
regimes (joint vs individual), I ignore diﬀerences in labour supply elasticities
of diﬀerent household members, or the possible divergences between social
and household preferences for redistribution.1 Rather, I want to focus on an
incentive problem that has been left out of the discussion so far, namely the
tax arbitrage possibilities that an individually based tax system may oﬀer to
households.
The mechanism through which such arbitrage can occur is simple: within
the household, its members can exchange leisure for consumption (dispos-
able income) by rescheduling duties in housework and by compensating each
other for this. Such a side trade in leisure for money can easily be enforced by
the presence of trust among the household members. When the government
designs the tax schedule, it should take into account that people may engage
1Boskin (1975) and Boskin & Sheshinski (1983) were the first to investigate the ques-
tion whether the individual or the household is the apporpriate tax unit. They provide
Ramsey-type arguments against the practice of income splitting where husband and wife
face the same marginal tax rate: the higher wage elasticity of the secondary worker war-
rants a lower marginal tax rate. Apps & Rees (1988, 1997a, 1997b) build on the Boskin-
Sheshinki model by introducing redistributional concerns within and across households
and by allowing for production within the household of a private household good. In all
these models, the marginal income tax rate is taken constant across income levels, but
possibly conditioned on gender. Munnell (1980) discusses the incongruence of three basic
axioms (progressivity, horizontal equity and neutrality w.r.t. marriage) in tax design.
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into this kind of arbitrage. Put diﬀerently, it should make the tax system
household incentive compatible. I will argue that the household compati-
bility constraints, together with the skewness of the income distribution put
structure on the graduation of the optimal marginal tax rate. To formalise
my argument, I build on the standard income taxation model for a two-class
economy as exposed by Stiglitz (1982), and then amend this model to al-
low for the fact that within a household people can co-ordinate their labour
market and homework decisions.
It is not so diﬃcult to understand why such co-ordination needs to be
taken into account. Consider a two-class economy and suppose that the
government has designed an individually incentive compatible tax system,
so that a high ability person prefers to earn a high rather than low income
level and pay the corresponding tax. Now, suppose in addition that two high
ability persons form a household. They could agree that one of them takes a
part time job on the labour market, earning a low income level with a low tax
liability, and that the other earns a high income level with a high tax liability.
To the extent that the individual incentive compatibility constraint is slack,
the low income earner will initially enjoy a lower utility level. But the fact
that both agents have taken a diﬀerent stance in the labour market makes
their marginal rates of substitution between disposable income and leisure
diﬀer. The wider this diﬀerence, the larger the opportunities for mutually
improving side trades. For suﬃciently large side trading opportunities, both
members earning a high income level (and paying high taxes) will turn out
to be a dominated strategy.
There are two ways in which the government can contain side trade oppor-
tunities. One is to distort the labour supply of high ability agents downwards,
i.e. to impose a positive marginal tax rate on high income levels. A second
way is to make the initial welfare loss to a high ability person when earn-
ing a low income level suﬃciently high, and this can be done by distorting
low incomes downwards. The social cost of distorting a bundle is directly
proportional to the number of people opting for it. The social benefit, on
the other hand, is the reduction in informational rent and is proportional to
the number of people that are discouraged from opting for the bundle. This
means that the optimal size of the distortion depends on the number of peo-
ple whose behaviour is distorted vs the number who are discouraged. And
this relative number depends in turn on the direction of redistribution and
the skewness of the ability distribution. That is why household incentive
compatibility puts structure on the graduation of the income tax schedule.
The paper relates to the literature on taxation with side trade opportu-
nities. In that literature, one is concerned with the design of a tax system
when perfect side trading opportunities exist, either through multilateral
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coalition formation (Hammond, 1987) or by trading on perfectly competi-
tive side markets (Guesnerie, 1995, ch 1).2 For both cases, it is shown that
the only feasible tax systems that can be designed are linear ones. In an
earlier paper (Schroyen, 1997), I characterised an eﬃcient commodity tax
system when side trading is limited to take place within bilateral coalitions
and investigated how much better this system performs w.r.t. fully linear
commodity taxation. The present paper focusses on income taxation and
its relation to household production activities. It is organised as follows.
In the next section, I describe the basic model. In section 3, I discuss the
household incentive compatibility constraints and derive the Pareto eﬃcient
income tax schedule for a two class society with perfect assortative mating.
The case of imperfect assortative mating is studied in section 4. Section 5
concludes with a discussion of the main assumptions.
2 The model
The framework that I use builds on the standard two-class model for optimal
taxation, as exposed by Stiglitz (1982). A large number of citizens populate
the economy. A fraction µL of them have a low productive ability wL, while
the complementary fraction µH(= 1−µL) is endowed with a high productive
ability wH (> wL). All citizens dispose of a total time endowment equal to
unity, and they all share the same utility function defined over private con-
sumption (x), leisure (`) and a ‘public’ household commodity (h), u(x, `, h),
which displays the standard properties of monotonicity and strict concavity.
The private consumption good is a normal good that is produced with a lin-
ear production technology whose transformation coeﬃcients for both types
of labour are normalised to unity. If the consumption good is treated as the
nume´raire, the productive abilities of the citizens also represent their real
wage rates. The household commodity cannot be bought on the market, but
only produced at home by devoting household time. I assume that g hours
spent on household production activity yields h(g) units of the household
good, where h(·) is a concave production function measuring the tidiness of
the house, the extent to which children are taken care oﬀ, etc.
Each citizen in this economy lives with one other citizen in a household.
So there are no households with three or more members, and neither are there
people living on their own.3 In a first instance I assume perfect alignment of
2In a recent paper, Agell & Persson (2000) describe the implications for labour supply
decisions when workers can tax arbitrate via the asset market. That analysis takes the
income tax schedule as given and does not derive any normative implications.
3What is really necessary is that each household consists of two (and only two) pro-
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productive abilities, that is every household consists only of people belonging
to the same ability class. In section 4, however, I will relax this assumption
and show that the results go through with imperfect assortative mating.
The decision process within each household takes place in a co-operative
way. In particular, I use Samuelson’s (1956) consensus model and assume
that household partners maximise a utilitarian welfare function defined over
their individual utilities.4 Though there is a quickly emerging literature on
non-co-operative bargaining within marriage (recently reviewed by Lundberg
& Pollak, 1996), I take the household as an institution where trust and
reputation work suﬃciently well to enforce agreements made by its members.
I should hasten to add that the household partners need not be legally linked
through marriage. They can be, but they can also be any pair of people
willing to assume the shared responsibility for the production of household
commodities, be it because they are in love with one another, or because they
are good friends and agree to share accommodation. I also note here that
the existence of households and their co-operative decision-making is taken
as given. No attempt is made to explain why and how households form.
Let us now consider a household of type i (= L,H) composed of Alice
(a) and Bert (b) who agree to co-ordinate their consumption, earnings (Y )
and housework contributions (g) so as to maximise the sum of their utilities.
Allowing also for a (possibly negative) side payment si from Bert to Alice,
this household solves the following problem in the absence of taxation:
max
Yia,Yib,gia,gib,si
u
µ
Yia + si, 1− Yia
wi
− gia, h(gia + gib)
¶
+
u
µ
Yib − si, 1− Yib
wi
− gib, h(gia + gib)
¶
.
Denoting household member m’s marginal rate of substitution between
gross earnings and private consumption by MRSim def= u
im
`
wiuimx
(m = a, b)
(subscripts on the utility function denote partial derivatives), the solution to
this problem is characterised by the equalitiesMRSia =MRSib, uia` = u
ib
` =
(uiah + u
ib
h )h
0, and uiax = u
ib
x .
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ductive members. The presence of unproductive members does not aﬀect the analysis,
provided this presence influences the preferences of the productive household members in
the same way in each household.
4Put diﬀerently, each partner has ’caring’ preferences with a 100% degree of caring.
Caring preferences invlolve separability, interpersonal utility comparisons and thus car-
dinalisation (Chen & Wooley, 2001 p 726). By considering 100% caring, each partner
internalises the eﬀects of his/her own actions on the other partner’s welfare.
5One possible solution is where Yia = Yib, gia = gib, and si = 0. But then clearly
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I will now assume that the government would like to raise the living stan-
dard of low ability households to the level W
L
, say. The government cannot
observe individual abilities, neither does it observe the amounts of time sup-
plied on the labour market or used for household work, nor the amount of
money household members transfer to each other. However, it is aware of the
statistical distribution of abilities, and it can observe the gross income (Y )
each citizen earns on the labour market. The revelation principle then says
that the government can replicate any redistribution of resources it achieves
using an income tax schedule by a direct mechanism where it allocates (net
income, gross income)-bundles to citizens upon their announcement of their
abilities, provided the mechanism satisfies the appropriate incentive com-
patibility constraints.6 To formulate these constraints, it is useful to define
a household’s semi-indirect utility function, giving for any pair of (net in-
come, gross income)-bundles [(ca, Ya), (cb, Yb)] the maximal welfare level that
household i can achieve, i.e.
W i[(ca, Ya), (cb, Yb)]
def
= max
gia,gib,si
u
µ
ca + si, 1− Ya
wia
− gia, h(gia + gib)
¶
+
u
µ
cb − si, 1− Yb
wib
− gib, h(gia + gib)
¶
. (1)
The solution to the above problem is characterised by the equalities:
uiax = u
ib
x and u
im
` = [u
ia
h + u
ib
h ] · h0(ga + gb) (m = a, b).
These may also be combined to give MRSia =MRSib.
Clearly, when the two household members receive the same (net income,
gross income)-bundle, these conditions can only be verified if both have the
same housework load and no money is transferred between them.
To proceed with the analysis, let me first focus on the case where the two
household members go for the same (net income, gross income)-bundle, (c, Y )
say–let me call this uniform labour market behaviour. Under such behaviour,
Yia + εwi, Yib − εwi, gia − ε, gib + ε, and si = −εwi also constitutes a solution: since
both partners have the same market and household productivities, any reallocation of the
optimal amount of total factor earnings and total household activity is optimal as well.
6One could argue that in a society with only intra-class household formation and ab-
sence of singles, the tax administration could partially solve the incentive problem by
imposing a very high tax liability on any household submitting two diﬀerent income re-
turns, provided it has reliable records on who forms with whom a household. But there
are two objections to this argument. First, as I have argued earlier, the household is not
necessarily an a priori verifiable coalition. Second, if by law the individual is considered
as the tax unit, the use of non-individual information would fall outside the discretion of
the the tax authority.
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the marginal rate of substitution for a household of type i coincides with the
marginal rate of substitution of its members:
dc
dY
|dW i=0 =MRSia =MRSib.
I assume that at any (c, Y )-bundle a low ability household will have
a larger marginal rate of substitution than a high ability household, i.e.
dc
dY |dWL=0 > dcdY |dWH=0 (single crossing).7 Under uniform labour market be-
haviour, the incentive compatibility constraint for household i can be written
as:
W i[(ci, Yi), (ci, Yi)] ≥ W i[(cj , Yj), (cj , Yj)] (i, j = L,H). (3)
These incentive constraints (which I will refer to as the individual incen-
tive compatibility constraints), together with the single crossing property,
imply that both the gross and the net earnings of a high ability individ-
ual should be higher than that of a low ability individual: cH > cL and
YH > YL. Moreover, because the government wants to redistribute from
rich to poor, and because it is constrained in this by the budget constraint
µL(YL − cL) + µH(YH − cH) = 0, the ratio cH−cLYH−YL should be smaller than 1.
If households for some reason only display uniform labour market behav-
iour, we know from standard income tax theory that it is eﬃcient to distort
the bundle intended for the low ability agents to make the mimicking strat-
egy less tempting for high ability households. This bundle is distorted in the
sense that the low ability agent’s MRS at this bundle is lower than 1, i.e.
that (s)he faces a positive marginal income tax rate.8 On the other hand,
because the low ability person will never have an incentive to choose the
bundle intended for a high ability agent, the latter should receive an undis-
torted bundle; that is, a bundle for which his/her MRS equals unity, or still
in other words, one for which the implicit marginal tax rate is zero. See e.g.
Stiglitz (1982, p 218).
7In the standard model, normality of consumption (d( u`ux )/d` ≤ 0) is a suﬃcient con-
dition. With the presence of the household good, we need in addition that d( u`uh )/d` ≤ 0,
d(uhu` )/dh ≤ 0 and d( u`ux )/dh ≤ 0. This is e.g. the case when uh` = 0 and uxh ≥ 0.
8Facing a marginal tax rate t, a person with wage rate w selects a labour supply in
accord with the FOC u`ux = (1 − t)w. 1 − u`wux can thus be interpreted as the implicit
marginal tax rate.
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3 Non-uniform labour market behaviour and
household incentive compatibility
From now on, I shall drop the constraint that members of the same household
can only make identical labour market choices. First, consider a household
of type H and its indiﬀerence curve conditioned on uniform labour market
behaviour, dWH [(c, Y ), (c, Y )] = 0, passing through (cH , YH). This is drawn
as the tin line in figure 1. Next, consider the indiﬀerence curve passing
through the same bundle but conditioned on (cH , YH) being selected by Bert:
dWH [(c, Y ), (cH , YH)] = 0. I now claim that when the household good does
not aﬀect the marginal willingness to pay for leisure in a too strong way, this
second indiﬀerence curve is the lower envelope to the first as shown by the
bold line in figure 1. This is stated more generally as
Lower Envelope Condition (LE)—The indiﬀerence curve dW i[(c, Y ), (c, Y )]
=0 is the lower envelope to the indiﬀerence curve dW i[(c, Y ), (c, Y )] = 0, at
bundle (c, Y ).
Loosely speaking, LE follows from the fact that non-uniform labour mar-
ket behaviour opens up for Pareto improving side trades: if Alice goes for
(cL, YL) and Bert for (cH , YH), then they not only are on the same welfare
level as when both going for (cH , YH), but they have also ended up with dif-
ferent marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption; this
then opens up for a Pareto improving side trade. This is a loose argument
because leisure cannot be traded directly for money, but only indirectly via
the household public good whose quantity in turn may aﬀect the preferences
for (x, `) bundles. Lemma 2 in the appendix identifies the restrictions on
preferences for LE to hold.
When LE does not hold, a household’s self-selection constraint under
non-uniform labour market behaviour will be slack when the corresponding
constraint under uniform labour market behaviour binds. In that case we
are back to the standard solution discussed in the previous section. On the
other hand, when LE does hold, it is the self-selection constraints under non-
uniform labour market behaviour that take over. This will be the subject of
analysis in the remainder of the paper.
The redistribution problem of the government may now be formulated as
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YL                YH
cH
cL
WH[(c,Y),(c,Y)]= HW
WH[(c,Y),(cH,YH)]=
HW
Figure 1.  Illustration of the Lower Envelope Condition
Figure 1:
follows:
max
cL,YL,cH ,YH
WH [(cH , YH), (cH , YH)]
s.t. WL[(cL, YL), (cL, YL)] ≥ WL (ω)
WH [(cH , YH), (cH , YH)] ≥WH [(cH , YH), (cL, YL)] (λ)
µL(YL − cL) + µH(YH − cH) ≥ 0 (γ)
(P1)
The first constraint ensures that a low ability household obtains at least
the living standard W
L
. Constraint (λ) is the household incentive compati-
bility constraint ensuring that a high ability household can never do better
by posing as a household with both a high and a low ability member. As
I have just argued, if this constraint is verified the individual self-selection
constraint will be slack. Thus the set of household incentive compatible al-
locations is a strict subset of the set of individually incentive compatible
allocations.9 Constraint (γ) rules out that the government runs a deficit.
Finally, I mention that the strategy of posing as a household with diﬀerent
abilities is credible in the sense that it pays for each member if it does so for
the household.10 No member will therefore refuse to consider this mimicking
strategy.
Performing the operations foc(cL)·MRSL+foc(YL) and foc(cH)·MRSH+
foc(Y H) and making use of the envelope theorem on problem (1), results in
9Theorem 1 in the appendix to section 3 shows that a Pareto eﬃcient tax policy that
redistributes from H to L is only constrained by the incentive restriction (λ).
10This is shown formally in Theorem 2 in the appendix to section 3.
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the characterisation rules for the marginal tax rate on low and high incomes,
respectively:
1−MRSH = λbuHx
γµH
[MRSH −M bRSH ], and (4)
1−MRSL = λbuHx
γµL
[MRSL −M bRSH ], (5)
where M bRSH (buHx ) denotes the common marginal rate of substitution (mar-
ginal utility of consumption) on which the members of a high ability house-
hold settle after they have opted for the package [(cH , YH), (cL, YL)] and have
concluded an eﬃcient side trade.
The sign of (4)’s rhs hinges on the diﬀerence between two marginal rates of
substitution of a high ability person. The rate of substitution in his or her ca-
pacity of a member of a household choosing the package [(cH , YH), (cH , YH)],
MRSH , and the rate of substitution when the same household goes for the
package [(cH , YH), (cL, YL)] and subsequently reschedules housework and car-
ries out monetary compensation,M bRSH . This diﬀerence is positive because
the indiﬀerence curve dWH [(c, Y ), (cH , YH)] = 0 is convex and YL < YH .
Thus, as a husband to a YH-earning Alice, Bert tolerates a reduction of
MRSH Euro in net income when presented with the opportunity to earn one
Euro less gross income. But if Alice were to earn only YL, Bert tolerates a
reduction of onlyM bRSH Euro. This explains why distorting the gross earn-
ings of high ability persons downwards is beneficial: by taxing high incomes
at the margin, the gap between the YH-earning household member’s marginal
willingness to pay for leisure and that of the YL-earning household member is
reduced, side trading opportunities are mitigated and the household incentive
compatibility constraint is relaxed.
The marginal tax rate on low incomes is given by (5). Its sign depends on
the diﬀerence of two marginal rates of substitution: the rate of substitution
for an L-household with both members going for the bundle (cL, YL),MRSL
and M bRSH . This diﬀerence will be positive for an optimal allocation.11 A
one Euro reduction in YL, together with a reduction in cL of MRSL Euro,
leaves household L equally well oﬀ. An H-household engaging in tax arbi-
trage can at most aﬀord a reduction in cL of M bRSH Euro. So the incentive
11We cannot just rely on a single crossing argument to sign this diﬀerence, since MRSL
measures the slope of the indiﬀerence curve dWL[(c, Y ), (c, Y )] = 0, while M bRSH mea-
sures the slope of the indiﬀerence curve dWH [(c, Y ), (cH , YH)] = 0, both evaluated at
(cL, YL). However, it should be clear that if these two indiﬀerence curves cross twice, it
will be the right crossing that will be part of the optimal allocation. (A small movement of
the bundle at the left crossing along L’s indiﬀerence curve would increase the government
budget and weaken the self-selection constraint for the H-household.)
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compatibility constraint for this household is relaxed by distorting labour
earnings of L-households downwards.
We may now combine the two tax formulae to obtain
1−MRSH
1−MRSL =
µL +
λ
γ
buHx
µH +
λ
γ
buHx . (6)
This expression shows that whenever the distribution of abilities is skewed
to the right (µL > µH), the marginal tax rate on low incomes should be lower
than the marginal tax rate on high incomes. Notice that because the rhs
of (6) is strictly smaller than µL
µH
, this odds ratio of the ability distribu-
tion provides an upper limit on the optimal degree of marginal progressivity.
The intuition for marginal progressivity is easy. The benefit of distorting a
(net income, gross income)-bundle is to discourage dissembling behaviour.
It saves the government from leaving too much information rent with the
H-household and is thus proportional with the number of H-people. In
contrast, the aggregate cost of a distortion is borne in equilibrium and is
proportional to the number of people whose decisions are distorted. There-
fore, when there are relatively more low ability citizens, an optimal policy
should distort the behaviour of these people less than the behaviour of high
ability citizens. I summarise this discussion as
Proposition 1 Suppose condition LE holds. In a two-class economy with
perfect assortative mating, the marginal tax rate on both low and high incomes
is positive at a Pareto eﬃcient allocation. Whenever the distribution of abil-
ities is skewed to the right, the optimal marginal tax rate on high incomes
exceeds the marginal tax rate on low incomes.
4 The case of imperfect assortative mating
Amore correct picture of the world recognises the presence of a non-negligible
amount of households where the partners’ labour market productivities are
not aligned (surgeon & nurse, professor & secretary, etc).12 In this section,
I will investigate this case of imperfect assortative mating—some households
being formed by one low ability person and one high ability person. I will
call such households mixed and denote them by index M . So now the
economy consists of fL households of type L, fH households of type H, and
12For empirical evidence on the degree of assortative mating regarding educational at-
tainment, see e.g. Hauser (1982), Hout (1982) and Mare (1991) for the U.S., and Kravdal
& Noack (1989) for Norway.
10
fM households of type M . We have of course that fL + fM + fH = 1,
fL+
1
2
fM = µL and fH+
1
2
fM = µH ; and I still assume an ability distribution
skewed to the right (µL > µH). For H-households to remain present, fM
should belong to [0, 2µH); I will refer to such fM values as feasible.
A tax system with the individual as the tax unit should now specify four
(c, Y ) bundles. In addition to the bundles (cL, YL) and (cH , YH), two extra
bundles are designed: one for the low ability member of a mixed household
((cMl, YMl)), and one for its high ability member ((cMh, YMh)).
As will soon become clear, the addition of two new bundles boosts the
number of self-selection constraints significantly. In order to ease their ma-
nipulation, I assume from now on that preferences are quasi-linear in leisure
and strongly separable: u(x, `, h) def= v(x)+ `+ϕ(h) (v00,ϕ00 < 0). With such
preferences, condition LE is satisfied, the total optimal amount of household
work is fixed at G∗ (defined by ϕ0 (h0(G∗)) = 1
2
) and net household income
is shared equally. Thus, a household of type i with abilities wia and wib
and having chosen the bundles (ca, Ya) and (cb, Yb) will in addition to the net
utility from the public household good reach a welfare level
W i[(ca, Ya), (cb, Yb)] = 2v(
ca + cb
2
)− Ya
wia
− Yb
wib
.
I should stress here that though the total amount of household work is fixed
to G∗, this does not mean that its allocation over the two partners is. In
fact, as I will argue below, variability of the individual levels of housework
is essential for the partners to rearrange homework such that none of them
becomes worse oﬀ under any potential mimicking strategy of the household.13
To ease notation in what follows, I refer to the bundles (cL, YL), (cH , YH),
(cM`, YM`) and (cMh, YMh) just as L,H,Ml, andMh. Thus, the three family
welfare levels in equilibrium are written as:
WL(L,L) = 2v(
cL + cL
2
)− YL
wL
− YL
wL
,
WM(Ml,Mh) = 2v(
cMl + cMh
2
)− YMl
wL
− YMh
wH
, and
WH(H,H) = 2v(
cH + cH
2
)− YH
wH
− YH
wH
.
13With suﬃciently convex preferences, as in the previous section, this is automatically
the case (cf footnote 10). But quasi-linear preferences, and their utilitarian summation,
however, the household only cares about the total amount of leisure, not its distribution.
A shortcut is then to introduce individual rationality constraints when household members
consider a potential mimicking strategy—see footnote 15.
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Family welfare out-of-equilibrium is written in a similar way. For example
WM(L,H) = 2v(
cL + cH
2
)− YL
wL
− YH
wH
is the welfare level that a mixed household would achieve if its low ability
member chooses bundle (cL, YL) and its high ability member chooses (cH , YH).
Notice that for a mixed household, the order in which the two bundles enter
the indirect utility function matters (unlike for uniform households).
The government evaluates its tax policy by means of a weighted utilitarian
social welfare function:
SW
def
= fLβLW
L(L,L) + fMβMWM(Ml,Mh) + fHβHW
H(H,H),
where the weights βi (i = L,M,H) are normalised in the sense that fL
βL
wL
+
1
2
fM
βM
wL
+ 1
2
fM
βM
wH
+ fH
βH
wH
= 1. The following two conditions impose a
suﬃcient willingness to redistribute from rich to poor families (waa denotes
the arithmetic average of the ability distribution):
Assumption R1 : βL
wL
≥ βM
wL
> βM
wH
≥ βH
wH
.
Assumption R2 : wL
waa
≥ βM
wH
.
R1 is satisfied by equal (utilitarian) weights or any weight vector that
is negatively correlated with ability. It implies that βL
wL
> 1 > βH
wH
. Con-
dition R2 in addition puts an upper bound on βM
wH
. For utilitarian social
preferences, βM
wH
equals w
ha
wH
(where wha is the harmonic average of the ability
distribution), and R2 satisfied.14
The government’s problem is then to find four bundles L,Ml,Mh and H
to maximise SW under the budget constraint
fL(YL − cL) + 1
2
fM(YMl − cMl) + 1
2
fM(YMh − cMh) + fH(YH − cH) ≥ 0,
and three sets of self-selection constraints
WL(L,L) ≥WL(i, j), WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(i, j),WH(H,H) ≥WH(i, j)
where i, j ∈ {L,Ml,Mh,H}.
14Normalising wH to 1, this can be written as wLµLwL+(1−µL) ≥
1
µL
1
wL
+(1−µL) ⇐⇒ µL +
wL(1 − µL) ≥ µLwL + (1 − µL) ⇐⇒ (2µL − 1) ≥ (2µL − 1)wL. Since µL > 12 , and
wL < wH , R2 is verified.
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There are in total 33 self-selection constraints: 9 of the first and third
type, and 15 of the second type. In the appendix it is shown (lemma 8) that
these constraints impose the following ranking on the gross and net income
levels:
YMl < YL < YH < YMh, and cMl < cL < cH < cMh.
Furthermore, I prove there (theorem 3) that under these monotonicity
constraints and the redistribution assumptions R1 and R2, the optimal pol-
icy is constrained by the following three self-selection constraints:
WH(H,H) ≥WH(L,H), (7)
WM(Ml,Mh) ≥ WM(L,H), and (8)
WM(Ml,Mh) ≥ WM(Ml,H). (9)
The first incentive constraint is familiar from the perfect assortative mat-
ing case; the second and the third are new and involve the mixed household.
Later, I will argue that the third need not bind the optimal solution, and
that if it does it implies no cost. Let me therefore assume that all three
constraints bind the solution. The last two may then also be written as
WM(Ml,H) = WM(L,H), and (10)
WM(Ml,Mh) = WM(Ml,H). (11)
The advantage of writing the constraints in this way is graphical rep-
resentation. Expression (10) states that Ml and L should both lie on the
indiﬀerence curve dWM(·,H) = 0, while according to (11),Mh andH should
both lie on dWM(Ml, ·) = 0. In addition, expression (7) (with equality) then
reads that bundles L and H should both belong to the conditional indiﬀer-
ence curve dWH(·,H) = 0. Three indiﬀerence curves thus connect the four
bundles—see figure 2 (the dotted indiﬀerence curve will be referred to later).
As I mentioned earlier, in order for no household member to get worse oﬀ
under mimicking (then when being honest), it is required that they reschedule
homework (even though the household is equally well oﬀ).15
To derive and analyse the optimal solution to the taxation problem, I
proceed as Weymark (1986a, 1986b, 1987) and write the income levels in
15To illustrate the role of household production, consider (7). Individual utility when
the household is honest is given by v(cH)− YHwH +ϕ(h(G∗))− G
∗
2 . If this household chooses
(L,H), individual welfares are v( cL+cH2 ) − YLwH + ϕ(h(G∗)) − ga, and v( cL+cH2 ) − YHwH +
ϕ(h(G∗)) − gb, where ga + gb = G∗. For both members to be willing to consider the
13
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Figure 2.  A household incentive compatible allocation without assortative mating.
Figure 2:
terms of diﬀerences in the utility of consumption. From (7) (with equality),
(10) and (11) it follows that
YH = YMh − 2wH∆M ,
YL = YMh − 2wH∆H − 2wH∆M ,
YMl = YMh − 2wH∆H − 2wH∆M − 2wL∆L,
where ∆M
def
= [v(cMl+cMh
2
)− v( cMl+cH
2
)], ∆H
def
= [v(cH)− v( cH+cL2 )], and ∆L
def
=
[v( cL+cH
2
) − v( cMl+cH
2
)]. Substituting YH , YL and YMl for the expressions
above in the budget constraint, this can be solved for YMh.This relation
mimicking strategy (L,H) neither should work too much at home:
G∗
2
+
YH
wH
− YL
wH
− [v(cH)− v(cL + cH
2
)] ≥ ga, (IRa)
G∗
2
− [v(cH)− v(cL + cH
2
)] ≥ gb, (IRb)
where the last inequality may also be written as
ga ≥ G
∗
2
− [v(cH)− v(cL + cH
2
)] (IR0b)
since ga + gb = G∗. Combining (IRa) and (IR0b), it is easy to check that there exists a
solution to ga (and thus to gb) for both members to be willing to consider mimicking, if and
only if WH(L,H) ≥WH(H,H). Thus, unless the self-selection constraint (7) holds with
equality, the individual rationality constraints cannot be verified simultanously. Since the
square bracket term in (IRa) and (IRb) is positive, it is clear that under mimicking, a does
more than half of the homework (and b less than half).
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can in turn be used to express the other three income levels in terms of
aggregate consumption and the utility diﬀerences, and thus in terms of the
four consumption levels: Yi = Yi(cL, cH , cMl, cMh) (i = L,H,Ml,Mh).The
same is true for social welfare: SW = SW (cL, cH , cMl, cMh)—for details, see
the appendix, section 7.2.2.
The original optimal taxation problem is therefore equivalent to the fol-
lowing reduced form problem:
max
cL,cH ,cMl,cMh
SW (cL, cH , cMl, cMh)
s.t. YMl(cL, cH , cMl, cMh) ≥ 0 (κ)
0 ≤ cMl ≤ cL ≤ cH ≤ cMh
(P2)
When analysing this taxation problem, I will ignore the monotonicity con-
straints in the net income levels ci.
The fact that bundleMh is not part of any mimicking strategy suggests
that it should be made available in an undistorted way. This is confirmed
by the first order condition w.r.t. cMh:
(1− κ)1
2
fM
·
wH v
0(
cMl + cMh
2
)− 1
¸
= 0.
For κ ∈ [0, 1), it is clear that a necessary condition for an optimum is that
wH v
0( cMl+cMh
2
) = 1, or that the marginal tax rate faced by the high ability
member of a mixed household is zero.16 This no-distortion-at-the-top result
ties down the value of net income to the mixed household, cMl + cMh.
The first order condition for cMl provides the equilibrium value for the
Lagrange multiplier κ:
κ =
1
2
fm(wH − wL)
wL +
1
2
fm(wH − wL) , (12)
which is indeed strictly smaller than one, and equal to zero when mixed
households are absent. The non-negativity constraint on YMl is thus strictly
binding. This is not surprising since the low ability member of the mixed
household has a comparative advantage in doing the household work and
an eﬃcient policy should not make this member participate on the labour
market.
The optimal value for cMl is not unique. For, suppose that (8) is strictly
binding. Then we can slightly reduce cMl and increase cMh with the same
amount. This leaves total net income of the mixed household unaﬀected, it
16The marginal tax rate for member a of household i when receiving the bundles
(ca, Ya), (cb, Yb) is defined as 1− dcadYa |dW i[(ca,Ya),(cb,Yb)=0 = 1− 1wiav0( ca+cb2 ) .
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does not change government revenue, and it turns (8) into a strict inequality.
Thus the constraints that really limit the redistribution problem are (7) and
(9), and nothing is lost by imposing (8).
The optimality conditions for cH and cL are given by
(1− κ)fH [wH v0(cH)− 1] = A
·
wHv
0(
cL+cH
2
)− wHv0(cH)
¸
, (13)
(1− κ)fL [wL v0(cL)− 1] = A
·
wHv
0(
cL+cH
2
)− wLv0(cL)
¸
−BwLv0(cL),
(14)
respectively, where
A
def
= fH(1− κ− βH
wH
) + fM(1− κ− βM
wH
), and
B
def
=
1
2
fM(
wH
wL
− 1)(1− κ− βM
wH
).
I first comment on (13). The square bracket term on the lhs is the loss in
tax revenue from an H-household when cH is lowered marginally and YH ad-
justed downwards withwH v0(cH) to keep family welfare constant. The square
bracket term on the rhs is positive due to the monotonicity assumption; it
measures by how much mimicking becomes more costly for an H-household.
This is multiplied by A, the social benefit of inducing self-selection. First,
notice that A reduces to µH(1 − βHwH ) > 0 when fM approaches zero. Thus,
with a small fraction of mixed households, the implicit marginal tax rate on
YH is positive as shown for more general preferences in the perfect stratifica-
tion case. The formula reveals that the argument to distort YH downwards
is augmented by the desire to distribute away from the mixed household (to
the extent that βM
wH
is smaller than one, which it is under R2) but weakened
by the non-negativity constraint on YMl. (From the expression for YMl in
appendix 7.2.2., it transpires that it depends heavily on cH .)
Notice that due to R1, a suﬃcient condition for A to be positive is that
(1−κ− βM
wH
) > 0. In section 7.2.2 of the appendix, I show thatR2 guarantees
precisely this. We may therefore conclude that the marginal tax rate on YH
should be positive for any feasible value of fM .
The optimality condition for cL, (14) can be interpreted in a similar way.
It balances the budgetary costs with the self-selection benefits of a small
reduction in cL. Since the self-selection constraint WL(L,L) ≥ WL(L,H)
does not bind the optimal policy (cf theorem 3 in the appendix), the square
bracket term on the rhs of (14) is positive:17 to prevent that a member of
17Refer to figure 2 and compare the slope of the indiﬀerence curve dWL(L, ·) = 0 (the
dotted line), with that of the indiﬀerence curve dWH(H, ·) = 0 at the bundle L.
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an H-household dissembles as L, the L bundle should—on balance—be dis-
torted downwards. But when YL is reduced, it becomes less costly for an
M -household to opt for the package (L,H) and to the extent that the gov-
ernment wants to redistribute away from mixed households (1 > βM
wH
), this
has to be taken into consideration (the second term on the rhs of (14)). As
I just argued, the sign of B is positive and thus there is an argument for
distorting YL upwards.
Finally, to derive the graduation in the tax schedule I first solve (13) and
(14) for wH v0(cH) and wLv0(cL), and then subtract the latter expression from
the former. This yields:
wH v
0(cH)− wLv0(cL) = (15)
A
1−κ(fH − fL)
£
1− wHv0( cL+cH2 )
¤
+ B
1−κ
£
A
1−κwHv
0( cL+cH
2
) + fH
¤
( A
1−κ + fH)(
A
1−κ +
B
1−κ + fL)
.
Recall that A and B are positive. Because wHv0( cL+cH2 ) > wH v
0(cH) >
1, the first square bracket term on the rhs is negative. With an ability
distribution skewed to the right (fL > fH), the entire expression is positive.
This means that the marginal tax rate on YH is larger than the one on YL
for any feasible value of fM .
I now summarise the results on imperfect assortative mating in
Proposition 2 Consider a two-class economy with imperfect assortative mat-
ing, an ability distribution skewed to the right and social preferences favourable
to redistribution form rich to poor (in the sense of R1 and R2). The opti-
mal gross income distribution is then as follows:
• low ability members of a mixed household should not participate on the
labour market;
• members of a low ability household should earn a ’low’ income level YL;
• members of a high ability household should earn a ’high’ income YH; and
• high ability members of a mixed household should earn a ’very high’ income
YMh.
The marginal tax rate on YMh should be zero, that on YH should be positive,
and that on YL should be lower than the one on YH.
The analysis so far has given unambiguous qualitative results. To gauge
the magnitudes of the marginal tax rates on YL and YH and their diﬀerence,
I have solved the model for v(x) = log x, wL = 5, wH = 10, µL =
3
4
, and
βL = βM = βH . Figure 3 shows the optimal marginal tax rates when
the fraction of mixed households increases from 0 to .49 (for fM ≥ 12 , fH
is zero). The marginal tax rate on YH is positive and increasing in fM ,
17
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Figure 3.  Optimal marginal tax rates on YL (tL) and YH (tH) as a function of fM.
Figure 3:
while that on YL is slightly non-monotonic. The diﬀerence between both
rates increases the less perfect assortative mating is. Notice that in this
experiment, the total endowments in the economy remain the same—only the
structure of family composition changes. In figure 4, I present the family
welfare levels, as well as social welfare. Here we observe that less assortative
mating increases the welfare of L- andM -households, and up to some extent
also that of H-households. This indicates that the self-selection constraint
on H-households puts a heavier limit on redistribution policy than that on
M -households.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have looked at the tax treatment of households under in-
dividual filings and characterised the eﬃciency properties of an income tax
schedule that redistributes from rich to poor households. The fact that
tax liabilities are determined on individual incomes, but that the decision to
earn these incomes are made at the household level makes this a non-trivial
problem. This is because the tax liable members of the same household
can side trade leisure for net income with one another, and such side trade
opportunities enable them to carry out tax arbitrage.
For a two class economy with perfect assortative mating. The main
18
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Figure 4.  Family welfare (Wi , i=L,M,H) and social welfare (SW) as a function of fM.
Figure 4:
conclusion is that in order to prevent tax arbitrage, the government imposes
a positive marginal tax rate on high incomes and sets the marginal tax rate
on low incomes below this rate (when the ability distribution is skewed to
the right). Then I showed that these conclusions carry over to a society
with imperfect assortative mating. The novel feature that is introduced
by imperfect assortative mating concerns the income levels and their tax
treatment of the members of a mixed household. Low ability members of
such a household should be discouraged from participating in the labour
market, while the high ability partner should be given incentives to earn
a very high income level which is undistorted at the margin, but taxed on
average.
Let me now come back to some of the assumptions made earlier. I have
assumed that both household partners are equally eﬃcient in performing
housework and that their contributions are perfectly substitutable. If house-
hold members diﬀer in their housework productivities as well, the tax system
should take this into account by encouraging the more ‘house’-productive
members to spend less time on the labour market. With imperfect assorta-
tive mating w.r.t. both kinds of abilities, there are ten types of households
that may form. The design of an optimal income tax system becomes an
intricate problem, the more because the labour market decisions of the house-
hold members depend on their comparative advantages, while the taxes and
transfers that are based on these decisions should correct for diﬀerences in
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absolute advantages.18
A second feature of the model was that the time spent by one of the
partners in producing the household good is perfectly substitutable with the
time input of the other partner. I focused on this case to make my argument
in the sharpest possible way. But since side trade opportunities are driven
by substitutability, it is clear that the smaller the substitutability between
the two inputs, the weaker will be the household incentive compatibility
constraints. In the case of zero substitution (h = min{ga, gb}), the tax
arbitrage problem vanishes.19 It is not diﬃcult to imagine household goods
whose production does not allow substitution: a romantic evening together,
for example, is by definition of that kind. Related to this discussion is the
issue of observability of the household good. Some goods, are in principle
observable. One may for example assume that ’caring for the children’
could be observed—or at least that the government could make reasonable
guesses about how much of this good is produced (because it knows the
number of children and their age). But as long as the contributions of the
two productive members of the household are not separately observable, the
arbitrage problem remains. It would remain as well when the household
produced good was a private rather than public good; all that is needed then
is that this good can be shared among the household members.
Side trading opportunities were in this model maximally exploited by the
household because its members were committed to cooperation. Without
such cooperation some available options to arbitrate will not be made use
of and this will make the incentive constraints less binding. In this sense,
non-cooperative household members are a blessing for redistribution policy.
In another paper (Schroyen, 1997), I showed that in an economy with
two classes (people poorly and wealthy endowed with the nume´raire) when
side trade in commodities is possible within bilateral coalitions (intra- as well
as interclass coalitions), both types of people should face the same marginal
commodity tax, but the ’lump sum’ part of the tax should be diﬀerentiated
and a function of the amount traded with the production sector. The reason
that we do not get a uniform marginal income tax in the present setting
18In a recent paper, Balestrino et al (1999) analyse this problem for a society composed
of singles (thus avoiding the arbitrage problem).
19It was observed in footnote 16 that if the household considers the package
[(cL, YL), (cH , YH)], a should perform more than half of the household work in order that
b’s utility does not drop below the utility he obtains when the household chooses the
package [(cH , YH), (cH , YH)]. In general, a compensates b by doing more homework.
If a and b are devoted utilitarians, solely concerned with the sum of the two util-
ity levels, tax arbitrage may still occur because it makes available the ’average’ bundle
( cL+cH2 ,
YL+YH
2 ). I am grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
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with imperfect assortative mating, is that interclass side trading is restricted
within the institution of the mixed household. Side trade across households
is an interesting phenomenon that does take place (low ability persons doing
oﬀ-the-record housework in the house of high ability spouses). But we are
then venturing ourselves on the grounds of tax evasion and ’moonlighting’,
and should make explicit the audit strategies of the tax administration.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix to section 3
In this appendix, I identify the conditions for the LE property to hold (lemma 2),
then show that under single-crossing, the LE condition, and redistribution from
H to L, only the household incentive compatibility constraint for household H
may constrain the optimal policy (theorem 1) and finally demonstrate that if a
household is indiﬀerent between two packages, then so are both of its members
(theorem 2).
The following notation is used: H = (cH , Y H), L = (cL, Y L),MRS
H≡MRSH(H,H),
MRSL≡MRSL(L,L),M bRSH≡MRSH(L,H),M bRSL≡MRSL(L,H), where
MRSi(X,Y) denotes the common marginal rate of substitution the two members
of a household of type i settle on when one member has applied for the bundle X
and the other member has applied for the bundle Y. The incentive compatibility
constraints will be referred to as follows:
WH(H,H) ≥WH(L,H) : the HICH − constraint
WL(L,L) ≥WL(L,H) : the HICL − constraint
WH(H,H) ≥WH(L,L) : the IICH − constraint
WL(L,L) ≥WL(H,H) : the IICL − constraint
where HIC stands for household incentive compatibility (under non-uniform labour
market behaviour), and IIC stands for individual incentive compatibility (that is,
household incentive compatibility, but under the restriction that the two household
members must behave identically on the labour market).
The proof of theorem 1 is by contradiction and has the following structure.
Lemma 4 provides necessary conditions on the relation between average and mar-
ginal tax rates for the HICL-constraint to bind policy. Lemma 5 shows that at a
Pareto eﬃcient allocation (PEA), the HICH- and the HICL-constraints cannot
bind simultaneously. Lemma 6 characterises for a PEA the distortion in bundle
L when the HICL-constraint is binding. Using this result, as well as those in
lemma 3, theorem 1 then identifies the HICH-constraint as the only one binding
the PEA when redistribution goes from H to L.
Lemma 1 The IICL and IICH constraints imply that cL≤ cH and YL≤ Y H .
Proof. Follows immediately from the single crossing property.
The next lemma establishes the conditions for the Lower Envelope Condition
to hold. When a household where both members have ability w, and both choose
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(c, Y ) ,it ends up with the welfare level
f(c, Y )
def
= max
s,ga,gb
u[c, 1−Y
w
−ga, h(ga+gb)] + u[c, 1−
Y
w
− g
b
, h(ga+hb)].
When partner b of this same household is assigned the bundle (c,Y ), maximal
household welfare is given by
g(c, Y )
def
= max
s,ga,gb
u[c, 1− Y
w
− g
a
, h(ga+gb)] + u[c, 1−
Y
w
−gb, h(ga+hb)].
Both f(·) and g(·) are special cases of the welfare function (1). The next
lemma compares the curvature of the corresponding indiﬀerence curves in the
(c, Y )-plane through bundle (c,Y ).
Lemma 2 Suppose that (c,Y ) belongs to the indiﬀerence curve f(c, Y ) =W .
Then it also belongs to the indiﬀerence curve g(c, Y ) =W . When the household
good does not aﬀect the marginal willingness to pay for leisure in a too strong way
and uhh−u`h< 0, then g(c, Y ) =W is the lower envelope of f(c, Y ) =W .
Proof. The curvatures of the two indiﬀerence curves are given by
Kf
def
=
dMRSa(c, Y )
dYa
|df=0+dMRS
a(c, Y )
dYb
|df=0, and
Kg
def
=
dMRSa(c, Y )
dYa
|dg=0.
Since the two indiﬀerence curves are tangent at (c,Y ), I thus need to proof
that
Kf−Kg=dMRS
a(c, Y )
dYb
|dg=0> 0.
As neither Yb nor cb directly enter a’s utility function, they aﬀect a’s MRS
only through the optimal values for s, ga and gb. The curvature diﬀerence then
becomes:
Kf −Kg = [∂MRS
a
∂s
,
∂MRSa
∂ga
,
∂MRSa
∂gb
] ·
 ∂es/∂Y b∂ega/∂Y b
∂egb/∂Y b

where a tilde (~) denotes a compensated eﬀect (e.g. ∂es/∂Y b= ∂s/∂Y b+∂s/∂cb·MRSa).
For the sake of notational ease, but without loss of generality, I assume from
now on that the marginal productivity in household production is fixed at unity.
The row vector can then be written as:
[
∂MRSa
∂xa
,−∂MRS
a
∂`a
+
∂MRSa
∂h
,
∂MRSa
∂h
]
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Total diﬀerentiation of the FOCs w.r.t. the household variables gives: dsdga
dgb
 =
 2uxx −ux` ux`−ux` u`` − 2u`h + 2uhh −2u`h + 2uhh
ux` −2u`h + 2uhh u`` − 2u`h + 2uhh
−1 ·
 uxx −ux`w−uxh uh`w
ux` − uxh −u``w + uh`w
 · dcb
dYb
¸
where use has been made of the full symmetry between a and b at the bundle
(c,Y ).
Straightforward manipulation then gives:
∂es
∂Yb
=
1
2
MRS
∂ega
∂Yb
=
2uhh
w
+ 1
2
u``
w
− 1
2
ux
∂MRS
∂`
− ux ∂MRS∂h − 2uxhMRS
u`` + 4uhh − 4u`h
∂ega
∂Yb
+
∂ega
∂Yb
=
2ux
∂MRS
∂h
− ux ∂MRS∂`
u`` + 4uhh − 4u`h
where the denominator u``+4uhh−4u`h< 0 by concavity.
The diﬀerence in curvature (times u``+4uhh−4u`h) then becomes:
(Kf−Kg)(u``+4uhh−4u`h) =
∂MRSa
∂xa
1
2
MRSa(u``+4uhh−4u`h)+
∂MRSa
∂h
ux
µ
2
∂MRSa
∂h
− ∂MRS
a
∂`
¶
−∂MRS
a
∂`
µ
2
uhh
w
+
1
2
u``
w
− 1
2
ux
∂MRSa
∂`
− ux∂MRS
a
∂h
− 2uxhMRSa
¶
The conditions under which the rhs is negative thus guarantee LEC. Re-
arrangement of the rhs gives:
dM eRSa
dYa
(2uhh−2u`h)−
1
2
(MRSa)2(uxxu``−u2x`)− 2ux
∂MRSa
∂h
µ
∂MRSa
∂`a
− ∂MRS
a
∂h
¶
Note that normality of consumption gives ∂MRS
a
∂`
< 0, and that by convexity of
preferences in the (c, Y )-plane dM
eRSa
dYa
> 0, and by concavity of the utility function
u``< 0 and (uxxu``−u2x`) > 0.
If ∂MRS
a
∂h
>> 0, or ∂MRS
a
∂h
< 0, but |∂MRSa
∂h
| > |∂MRSa
∂`
| the whole expression
may become positive. On the other hand, if ∂MRS
a
∂h
< 0, but |∂MRSa
∂h
| < |∂MRSa
∂`
|,
the whole expression is negative. In words, a modest eﬀect of the public house-
hold good on the marginal willingness to pay for leisure ensures that Kf> Kg.
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Figure A.1.
MRSL
Figure 5:
In particular, this is true when the household good is strongly separable from
consumption and leisure. Then uxh= u`h= 0, and the above expression reduces
to
2uhh
dM eRSa
dYa
− 1
2
(MRSa)2(uxxu`` − u2x`)
which is clearly negative.
Lemma 3 (i) If the HICH-constraint is binding, then the IICH-constraint is
slack. (ii) If the HICL-constraint is binding, then the IICL-constraint is slack.
Proof. This follows immediately from the LE condition.
Lemma 4 A necessary condition for the HICL-restriction to constrain policy is
that MRSL < cH−cLYH−YL < M
bRSL.
Proof. Consider theHICL- restriction as binding. This means that both the
bundles (cH , Y H) and (cL, Y L) belong to the indiﬀerence curve dW
L[(·, ·), (cL, Y L)] = 0.
By the second order envelope theorem, this indiﬀerence curve is convex w.r.t. the
Y-axis—see figure A.1.
Simple inspection of this figure shows that MRSL< cH−cLYH−YL < M
bRSL.
Lemma 5 At a Pareto eﬃcient allocation, both HIC-constraints cannot be simul-
taneously binding.
Proof. Suppose both HIC-constraints are binding. Consider first the case
where µL=
1
2 . Suppose we were to carry out the following reform: a one unit
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reduction in YH , accompanied by dcH = −MRSH , and a one unit increase in
YL, accompanied by dcL = MRSL. This reform results in a (per household) tax
revenue change equal toMRSH−MRSL (and by Lemma 1 this change is positive),
but will not aﬀect the welfare of either type of household). The maximal reduction
in cH that anH-household can tolerate when one of its members dissembles as L is
given byM bRSH , so the first part of the reform results in a relaxation of theHICH-
constraint (measured in terms of the nume´raire) by MRSH −M bRSH . Likewise,
the minimal increase in cL that anH-household will require for compensation when
one of its members dissembles as L is given by M bRSH , so the second part of the
reform leads to a tightening of the HICH-constraint byMRSL−M bRSH . The net
relaxation of that constraint is therefore equal to MRSH −MRSL. On the other
hand, the first part of the reform tightens theHICL-constraint byM bRSL−MRSH
(the minimal increase in cH that an L-household will require for compensation
when one of its members dissembles as H is given byM bRSL, the actual increase is
MRSH), while the second part of the reform weakens that constraint byM bRSL−
MRSL. On balance, the HICL-constraint is thus relaxed byMRSH−MRSL. To
obtain the social desirability of the relaxations of the HIC-constraints, we should
multiply these amounts by the respective shadow prices. But the implication is
clear: if both HIC-constraints are binding, it is possible to construct a reform
which leaves every household equally well oﬀ, which results in an increase in tax
revenue and which relaxes both HIC-constraints. The original allocation could
therefore not have been Pareto eﬃcient. Since the tax revenue is even larger when
µL >
1
2 , the result holds for µL ≥ 12 .
Lemma 6 If only the HICL-constraint for a low ability household is binding at
an Pareto eﬃcient allocation, then MRSL > 1.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. suppose MRSL ≤ 1. If we replace bundle (cL, YL)
by (cL +MRSLdYL, YL+dYL), dYL > 0, household L is equally well oﬀ. The
new conditional household indiﬀerence curve that is tangent from below to the
unconditional indiﬀerence curve at the new bundle for L will now lie above the
bundle (cH , YH). Thus, after this reform, the HICL is slack, and the government
budget has increased by [1 −MRSL]dYL ≥ 0 , contradicting the fact that the
original allocation was Pareto eﬃcient.
Theorem 1 Suppose the LE condition holds. At an incentive compatible Pareto
eﬃcient income tax policy that redistributes income from H to L, at most the
HICH-constraint will restrict policy.
Proof. By lemma 3, the IIC constraints will never constrain policy, and by
Lemma 5, both HIC constraints cannot bind at a Pareto eﬃcient policy at the
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same time. This means that at most one HIC restriction constrains policy at an
optimum. Suppose it is the HICL-constraint. Lemma 4 and Lemma 6 then imply
that cH−cLYH−YL > 1. But this contradicts the fact that redistribution goes from H to L.
Hence, at most theHICH -restriction can constrain a Pareto eﬃcient redistributive
policy.
Lemma 7 When two household members choose diﬀerent bundles, but both are
still active in household work, both end up with the same amount of consumption
and leisure and are thus equally well oﬀ.
Proof. The first order conditions w.r.t s, ga, gb imply uax= ubx and ua`= u
b
`.
Suppose that (xa, `a) is the resulting optimal amount of consumption of leisure for
a. Then obviously, (xb, `b) = (xa, `a) solves these two equality conditions. The
slope of b’s iso marginal utility curves ux(xb, `b, h) = u
a
x and u`(xb, `b, h) = u
a
` in
the (x, `)-space are
d`b
dxb
|ubx(·)=uax=
−ubxx
ubx`
,and
d`b
dxb
|ub`(·)=ua`=
−ubx`
ub``
,
respectively. By the concavity of the utility function (uxxu``−u2x`> 0), the first
slope always exceeds (in absolute value) the second. Hence, the two iso marginal
utility curves cross only once in the (xb, `b)-space, namely at (xa, `a). This means
that both partners are equally well oﬀ.
Theorem 2 Suppose HICH is satisfied such that the household is at as well oﬀ
at (L,H) and (H,H), then so are its members. Moreover, at the package (L,H)
a performs more work at home than b such that both end up with the same amount
of leisure.
Proof. This follows immediately from lemma 7.
7.2 Appendix to section 4
7.2.1 Results on incentive compatibility
Lemma 8 Incentive compatibility of the allocation implies that the gross and net
income levels are ranked as follows: YMl ≤ YL ≤ YH ≤ YMh, and cMl ≤ cL ≤
cH ≤ cMh
Proof.
1. YMl ≤ YMh : follows directly from WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(Mh,Ml)
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2. YL ≤ YMh : follows directly from summing WL(L,L) ≥ WL(Mh,Ml) and
WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(L,L).
3. YL ≤ YH : follows directly from summing WL(L,L) ≥ WL(H,H) and
WH(H,H) ≥WH(L,L).
4. YMl ≤ YH : follows directly from summing WH(H,H) ≥WH(Ml,Mh) and
WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(H,H).
5. cMl ≤ cMh : follows from WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(Ml,Ml) and YMl ≤ YMh.
6. cMl ≤ cH ≤ cMh : follows from summing WH(H,H) ≥ WH(H,Mh) and
WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(Ml,H), from cMl ≤ cMh, and the concavity of v(·).
7. cMl ≤ cL ≤ cMh : follows from summing WL(L,L) ≥ WL(L,Ml) and
WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(L,Mh), from cMl ≤ cMh, and the concavity of v(·).
8. cL ≤ cH : follows from WL(L,L) ≥WL(H,H) and YL ≤ YH .
9. YMl ≤ YL : follows from WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(L,Mh), and cMl ≤ cL.
10. YH ≤ YMh : follows from WH(H,H) ≥WH(H,Mh), and cH ≤ cMh.
Lemma 9 Suppose that the four bundles L,H,Ml, andMh satisfy the monotonic-
ity constraints YMl ≤ YL ≤ YH ≤ YMh, and cMl ≤ cL ≤ cH ≤ cMh, as well as the
three self-selection constraints.
WH(H,H) =WH(L,H), (A1)
WM(Ml,Mh) =WM(L,H), and (A2)
WM(Ml,Mh) =WM(Ml,H), (A3)
Suppose in addition that the self-selection constraint
WL(L,L) ≥WL(L,H) (A4)
is verified. Then the remaining 29 self-selection constraints are verified as well.
Proof.
1. Constraints of the type WL(L,L) ≥WL(I, J), I, J ∈ {Ml,L,H,Mh} (8 in
addition to (A4))
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(a) WL(L,L) ≥ WL(L,Ml): from WM(L,H) = WM(Ml,H) and the
fact that at bundle L, the slope of dWL(L, ·) = 0 ( 1wLv0(cL)) ≤ slope of
dWM(·,H) = 0 ( 1
wLv0(
cL+cH
2
)
).
(b) WL(L,L) ≥WL(L,Mh): from (A4) and 3a)
(c) WL(L,L) ≥WL(Ml,Ml): from WL(L,L) ≥WL(L,Ml) and the fact
that the indiﬀerence curve dWL(·, ·) = 0 is the upper envelope of the
indiﬀerence curve dWL(L, ·) = 0.
(d) WL(L,L) ≥ WL(H,H): from WL(L,L) > WL(L,H) and the fact
that the indiﬀerence curve dWL(·, ·) = 0 is the upper envelope of the
indiﬀerence curve dWL(L, ·) = 0.
(e) WL(L,L) ≥ WL(Mh,Mh): from WL(L,L) ≥ WL(L,Mh) and the
fact that the indiﬀerence curve dWL(·, ·) = 0 is the upper envelope of
the indiﬀerence curve dWL(L, ·) = 0.
(f) WL(L,L) ≥ WL(Ml,H): from (A4) and the fact that WL(L,H) ≥
WL(Ml,H) follows from WM(L,H) ≥WM(Ml,H).
(g) WL(L,L) ≥ WL(H,Mh): from summing WH(H,H) ≥ WH(H,Mh)
(proved below, in 3a)) and WL(L,L) ≥ WL(H,H), and adding and
subtracting YMhwL to the rhs.
(h) WL(L,L) ≥WL(Ml,Mh): from 1f), (A3) and that fact that at bun-
dleH the slope of the indiﬀerence curve dWL(Ml, ·) = 0 ( 1
wLv0(
cMl+cH
2
)
)≥slope
of the indiﬀerence curve dWM(Ml, ·) = 0 ( 1
wHv0(
cMl+cH
2
)
).
2. Constraints of the type WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(I, J), I, J ∈ {Ml,L,H,Mh}
(13 in addition to (A2) and (A3)).
(a) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥ WM(L,Mh): from WM(Ml,Mh) = WM(Ml,H)
(from (A2) and (A3)) and the fact that at bundle Ml, the slope of
dWM(·,Mh) = 0 ( 1
wLv0(
cMl+cMh
2
)
)≥ slope of dWM(·,H) = 0.( 1
wLv0(
cMl+cH
2
)
).
(b) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(Mh,L): immediately from 2a)
(c) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(H,H): fromWM(Ml,Mh) =WM(L,H), (A1),
and the fact that at bundle L, the slope of dWM(·,H) = 0 ( 1
wLv0(
cL+cH
2
)
)≥
slope of dWH(·,H) = 0 ( 1
wHv0(
cL+cH
2
)
).
(d) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥ WM(H,Mh): from 2c), (A3) and the fact that at
bundleH, the slope of dWM(H, ·) = 0 ( 1wHv0(cH))≥ slope of dWM(Ml, ·) =
0 ( 1
wHv0(
cMl+cH
2
)
).
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(e) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(Mh,H): immediately from 2d).
(f) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥ WM(Mh,Mh): from 2d) and the fact that the in-
diﬀerence curve dWM(·, ·) = 0 tangent to dWM(·,H) = 0 at H has
more curvature.
(g) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥ WM(H,L): from WM(Ml,Mh) = WM(L,H) and
the fact that WM(L,H) ≥WM(H,L).
(h) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(H,Ml): from WM(H,Ml) ≤ WM(Ml,H) and
the fact that WM(Ml,Mh) =WM(Ml,H).
(i) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥ WM(L,L): from WM(Ml,Mh) = WM(L,H), (A1)
and the fact that at bundleH, the slope of dWH(·,H) = 0 ( 1wHv0(cH))≥
slope of dWM(L, ·) = 0 ( 1
wHv0(
cL+cH
2
)
).
(j) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(Ml,L): becauseWM(Ml,Mh) =WM(Ml,H),
WH(H,H) =WH(H,L), and the fact that atH the slope of dWM(Ml, ·) =
0 ( 1
wHv0(
cMl+cH
2
)
) ≤ slope of dWH(H, ·) ( 1wHv0(cH))=0.
(k) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(L,Ml): immediately from 2j).
(l) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥ WM(Ml,Ml): from 2j), (A2) and because at L the
slope of dWM(·,H) = 0 ( 1
wLv0(
cL+cH
2
)
) > slope of dWM(Ml, ·) = 0
( 1
wHv0(
cL+cMl
2
)
).
(m) WM(Ml,Mh) ≥WM(Mh,Ml): trivial.
3. Constraints of the type WH(H,H) ≥ WH(I, J), I, J ∈ {Ml,L,H,Mh} (8
in addition to (A1)).
(a) WH(H,H) ≥WH(H,Mh): from (A1), (A3) and the fact that at bun-
dleH, the slope of dWH(·,H) = 0 ( 1wHv0(cH)) > slope of dWM(Ml, ·) =
0.( 1
wHv0(
cMl+cH
2
)
).
(b) WH(H,H) ≥ WH(L,L): from (A1) and the fact that the indiﬀer-
ence curve dWH(·, ·) = 0 tangent to dWH(H, ·) = 0 at H has more
curvature
(c) WH(H,H) ≥ WH(L,Ml): because WM(Ml,H) = WM(L,H), (A1)
and the fact that at bundle L, the slope of dWM(·,H) = 0 ( 1
wLv0(
cL+cH
2
)
)>
the slope of dWH(·,H) = 0 ( 1
wHv0(
cL+cH
2
)
)
(d) WH(H,H) ≥ WH(L,Mh): from (A1), WM(Ml,H) = WM(L,H),
and the fact that at the bundleH, the slope of dWH(L, ·) = 0 ( 1
wHv0(
cL+cH
2
)
)>
the slope of dWM(Ml, ·) = 0 ( 1
wHv0(
cMl+cH
2
)
).
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(e) WH(H,H) ≥ WH(Ml,H): from (A1) , WM(Ml,H) = WM(L,H),
and the fact that at the bundle L, the slope of dWM(·,H) = 0 ( 1
wLv0(
cL+cH
2
)
)>
the slope of dWH(H, ·) = 0 ( 1
wHv0(
cMl+cH
2
)
).
(f) WH(H,H) ≥ WH(Ml,Ml): follows from 3e), and the fact that the
indiﬀerence curve dWH(·, ·) = 0 tangent to dWH(H, ·) = 0 at H has
more curvature.
(g) WH(H,H) ≥ WH(Mh,Mh): follows from 3a), and the fact that the
indiﬀerence curve dWH(·, ·) = 0 tangent to dWH(H, ·) = 0 at H has
more curvature.
(h) WH(H,H) ≥ WH(Ml,Mh): follows from 3e), and the fact that
WH(Ml,H) =WH(Ml,Mh) follows from (A3).
Theorem 3 Under redistribution assumptions R1 and R2, the optimal taxation
policy solves the reduced form problem (P2) subject to (A1),(A2), and (A3) will
not be constrained by the self-selection constraint WL(L,L) ≥ WL(L,H) (i.e. by
(A4))
Proof. By lemma 9, a tax policy that is monotonic and satisfies (A1)—(A4)
will be overall incentive compatible. Since the reduced form problem (P2) is
obtained from (P1) by imposing (A1)—(A3) and the budget constraint with equality
and eliminating all income levels, it remains to show that the solution to (P2)
satisfies (A4). The proof goes by contradiction. Suppose that at the optimal
policy described by (P2), the constraint WL(L,L) ≥ WL(L,H) is not satisfied.
Then it is required that the slope of the indiﬀerence curve dWL(L, ·) = 0 at bundle
L ( 1wLv0(cL)) is smaller than the slope of the indiﬀerence curve dW
H(H, ·) = 0 at the
same bundle ( 1
wHv0(
cL+cH
2
)
). But this means that the square bracket term on the
rhs of the optimality rule for cL (14) is negative, and therefore that 1wLv0(cL) > 1.
Since under R1 and R2 the coeﬃcient A is positive, the optimality rule for cH (13)
tells that the slope of the indiﬀerence curve dWH(H, ·) = 0 at bundleH ( 1wLv0(cH))
is smaller than 1. By convexity of H’s preferences, the slope of this indiﬀerence
curve at L must be even smaller. Since by assumption the indiﬀerence curve
dWL(L, ·) = 0 is flatter than the indiﬀerence curve dWH(H, ·) = 0 at bundle L,
the slope of the former indiﬀerence curve at that bundle must be smaller than 1.
This gives a contradiction.
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7.2.2 Solution to the reduced form taxation problem
The income levels can be expressed in terms of the aggregate consumption level
and the utility diﬀerences:
YMh = C + (fL +
1
2
fM + fH) (2wH∆M) + (fL +
1
2
fM) (2wH∆H) +
1
2
fM(2wL∆L)
YH = C − 1
2
fM (2wH∆M) + (fL +
1
2
fM) (2wH∆H) +
1
2
fM (2wL∆L)
YL = C − 1
2
fM (2wH∆M) + (
1
2
fM + fH) (2wH∆H) +
1
2
fM (2wL∆L)
YMl = C − 1
2
fM (2wH∆M)− (1
2
fM + fH) (2wH∆H)− (1− 1
2
fM) (2wL∆L).
where C def= (fLcL + 12fMcMl +
1
2fMcMh + fHcH).
The social welfare function may then be written as
1
2
SW = fLβL
µ
v(cL)− YL
wL
¶
+
1
2
fMβM
µ
v(
cMl + cMh
2
)− YMl
wL
¶
+
1
2
fMβM
µ
v(
cMl + cMh
2
)− YMh
wH
¶
+ fHβH
µ
v(cH)− YH
wH
¶
.
The derivatives of the Lagrangian to the reduced form problem. The
Lagrangian function to problem (P2) is defined as
L = fLβL
Ã
v(cL)−
1
wL
·
C +− 1
2
fM (2wH∆M ) + (
1
2
fM + fH) (2wH∆H) +
1
2
fM (2wL∆L)
¸!
+
1
2
fMβM
Ã
v(
cMl + cMh
2
)− 1
wL
·
C − 1
2
fM (2wH∆M )− (
1
2
fM + fH ) (2wH∆H )− (1 −
1
2
fM ) (2wL∆L)
¸!
+
1
2
fMβM
Ã
v(
cMl + cMh
2
)− 1
wH
·
C + (fL +
1
2
fM + fH ) (2wH∆M ) + (fL +
1
2
fM ) (2wH∆H) +
1
2
fM (2wL∆L)
¸!
+
fHβH
Ã
v(cH )−
1
wH
·
C +− 1
2
fM (2wH∆M ) + (fL +
1
2
fM ) (2wH∆H ) +
1
2
fM (2wL∆L)
¸!
+
κ
µ
C − 1
2
fM (2wH∆M )− (
1
2
fM + fH) (2wH∆H) − (1−
1
2
fM ) (2wL∆L)
¶
.
After making use of the two identities fL+fM+fH = 1 and fL
βL
wL
+ 1
2
fM
βM
wL
+
1
2
fM
βM
wH
+ fH
βH
wH
= 1 the derivatives of the Lagrangian are:
∂L
∂cL
= −fL + fL βL
wL
wLv
0(cL)−
·
1
2
fM(1− βM
wL
− κ) + fH(1− βH
wH
− κ)
¸
wHv
0(
cL + cH
2
)
−1
2
fM(1− βM
wL
− κ)wLv0(cL + cH
2
)− κwLv0(cL + cH
2
),
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∂L
∂cMl
= −1
2
fM +
1
2
fMwLv
0(
cMl + cMh
2
) +
1
2
fM(wH − wL)
·
v0(
cMl + cMh
2
)− v0(cMl + cH
2
)
¸
+κ
µ
1
2
fM − 1
2
fMwH
·
v0(
cMl + cMh
2
)− v0(cMl + cH
2
)
¸
+ (1− 1
2
fM)wLv
0(
cMl + cH
2
)
¶
,
∂L
∂cMh
= −1
2
fM+
1
2
fMwHv
0(
cMl + cMh
2
) + κ
1
2
fM
·
1− wHv0(cMl + cMh
2
)
¸
,
∂L
∂cH
= −fH +
·
2
1
2
fM(1− βM
wH
) + 2fH − fH βH
wH
¸
wHv
0(cH)− 1
2
fM(wH − wL)v0(cMl + cH
2
)−µ
1
2
fM(wH + wL)− 1
2
fM2βM + fHwH(1−
βH
wH
)
¶
v0(
cL + cH
2
)
+κ{fH +
·
wL +
1
2
fM(wH − wL)
¸
v0(
cMl + cH
2
)−
·
1
2
fM + fH
¸
2wHv
0(cH)
+
·
fHwH − wL + 1
2
fM(wH + wL)
¸
v0(
cL + cH
2
)}.
The optimality conditions. Equating ∂L
∂cMh
to zero immediately giveswHv0(cMl+cMh2 ) =
1. This result can then be used in ∂L
∂cMl
= 0 to yield
1
2
fM(wH−wL)(1− κ) = wLκ, (A5)
which can be rearranged to give the equilibrium value for κ given in the text.
Next, in ∂L
∂cL
, wLκ can be replaced by the lhs of (A5). Equating
∂L
∂cL
to zero then
gives
(1− κ)fL= fL
βL
wL
wLv
0(cL)−
·
fM(1− βM
wL
− κ) + fH(1− βH
wH
− κ)
¸
wHv
0(
cL + cH
2
).
Subtracting (1−κ)fLwLv0(cL) from both sides, and rearranging gives the first
order condition for cL as stated in the text.
Finally, by making use of (A5) we can eliminate the terms in v0(cMl+cH
2
) from
∂L
∂cH
. After rearrangement, we get the first order condition for cL as stated in the
text.
To obtain the expression for wH v0(cH)−wLv0(cL), I first solve (13) and (14)
for wH v0(cH) and wLv0(cL), respectively. This gives
wH v
0(cH) =
(1− κ)fH +AwHv0( cL+cH2 )
(1− κ)fH +A ,and
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wLv
0(cL) =
(1− κ)fL +AwHv0( cL+cH2 )
(1− κ)fH +A+B .
Subtracting this second equation from the first and putting the resulting rhs on a
common denominator, then gives (15).
The expression (1− κ−βM
wH
) is positive. Since 1− κ = wL
wL+
1
2
fM (wH−wL) ,
(1− κ−βM
wH
) positive requires that
wL
wL +
1
2
fM(wH − wL) −
βM
wH
≥ 0
m
2wL
h
(βM
wH
)−1 − 1
i
(wH − wL) ≥ fM .
A suﬃcient condition for this to hold is that the lhs exceeds the largest feasible
value for fM , 2µH , or
wL
h
(βM
wH
)−1 − 1
i
(wH − wL) ≥ µH
m
wL(
βM
wH
)−1 ≥ waa
m
wL
waa
≥ βM
wH
which is condition R2.
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